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Abstract 
Raymond Geuss has been viewed as one of the figureheads of the recent debates about 
realism in political theory. This interpretation, however, depends on a truncated 
understanding of his work of the past thirty years. I will offer the first sustained engagement 
with this work (in English and German) which allows understanding his realism as a project 
for reorienting political theory, particularly the relationship between political theory and 
politics. I interpret this reorientation as a radicalization of realism in political theory through 
the combination of the emphasis on the critical purpose of political theory and the provision 
of practical, contextual orientation. Their compatibility depends on Geuss’ understanding of 
criticism as negative, of power as ‘detoxified’ and of the critical purchase of political theory 
as based on the diagnostic engagement with its context. This radicalization particularly 
challenges the understanding of how political theory relates to its political context. 
 
Introduction 
Raymond Geuss’ recent work has been received as an important contribution to realism 
in political theory.1 One could go as far as to claim that second only to Bernard Williams, 
Geuss counts as a figurehead of the recent debates about realism.2 Geuss certainly shares a 
number of the core criticisms of the realists, including the rejection of ideal theory and 
idealization, moralization and the legalism of liberal-normative political theory.3 However, as 
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far as Geuss has been invoked as an example of realist criticisms of ‘high liberalism’ it has 
been at the cost of a differentiated and nuanced account of his position, either reducing him to 
a member of the realist “ragtag band”4 or mischaracterizing his position as leaving the remit 
of political theory through concentration on power or history alone, thus eschewing the task 
of philosophical justification.5  
Despite the popularity of Geuss’ writings since the publication of Philosophy and Real 
Politics and the earlier judgments that his writings are refreshing for political theory or even 
radically innovative and pose a challenge to the current orthodoxy in political theory,6 the 
judgment of Glyn Morgan that “Geuss’ writings have attracted far less critical attention than 
they deserve [...]”7 still more or less holds true. More specifically, the distinctiveness of 
Geuss’ realism and its potential for radicalizing realism has thus far not been discussed in 
depth.8 I will redeem this lack through offering the first sustained interpretation of Geuss’ 
realism taken on its own terms. Thus interpreted, Geuss’ realism offers a more radical 
reorientation of political theory than the accounts of realism which have dominated the 
debates of the past five years. More specifically, the interpretation seeks to show that Geuss’ 
understanding of realism has the potential to combine the ambitions for practical orientation 
and subversively critical evaluation of a political context. 
For these purposes, I will outline the distinctive features of Geuss’ realism and then 
briefly relate them mostly to the limitations of the recently prevalent accounts of realism in 
political theory. The distinctive features of Geuss’ realism to be considered here – Geuss’ 
understanding of the purposes of political theory and of criticism, of power and of how 
political theory should try to relate to the political context into which it intervenes , and of 
politics – are also key for these realist political theories. I will concentrate these comparisons 
on those realists who have offered the most incisive criticisms of liberal-normative political 
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theory and have done the most for positively developing realist political theory.9 These are 
the realisms inspired by Bernard Williams.10  
 
Political theory as a critical activity of negative criticism 
I will start by considering Geuss’ views on purposes of political theory. This leads to a 
discussion of his understanding of criticism. Geuss argues that under current political 
circumstances, political theory should mainly “contribute to enabling ‘thinking differently’ 
(penser autrement) […]. A philosophy which is true to the best of its traditions, should 
refrain from delivering additional ‘philosophical grounding’ for what already exists, for our 
contemporary liberal-democratic social order.”11 Rather, the principal task of political theory 
is to critically examine one’s political context.12 Geuss serves this task through using what 
one could call the triangulation of conceptual history, genealogy and criticism of ideology for 
the examination contemporary political theory, politics and their relationship.13 These 
‘methodological choices’ support Geuss’ commitments to self-reflection, particularly about 
the relationship between political theory and its political context (but also about the 
relationship between the methods and goals of his realism), and to negative criticism. His 
evaluation of political theories is to a considerable extent driven by the criterion of whether 
the theory in question reinforces or questions those aspects of the political order which are 
taken for granted.14 For him political and moral theories cannot help but be connected to their 
political context and it is the task of the theorist to critically reflect on the terms of the 
relationship.15 His limitation to the interrogation and questioning of the status quo further 
points to his commitment to negative criticism. His preferred negative understanding of 
criticism is crucial for grasping how he understands the critical orientation of poli tical theory: 
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“In the political realm appeals to the need for ‘constructive’ criticism can in principle represent a 
(generally laudable) attempt to remind those involved in some evaluation of human action of the 
need to remain aware of a kind of internal demand under which such criticism operates, namely of 
the need to keep Tschernyschevsky’s (and later Lenin’s) central question ‘What is to be done?’ 
firmly in mind; in fact, however, the demand for ‘constructive criticism’ in general functions  as  a 
repressive attempt to shift the onus probandi and divert attention from the possibility of radical 
criticism.”16 
Geuss sees this as connected to the tendency of human societies to inertion, which 
generates status quo-conserving mechanisms including the constructiveness condition of 
criticism.17 For Geuss the constructiveness condition of criticism is especially problematic 
because it leads to a more or less tacit acceptance of the frameworks of reference of the 
target-agents of criticism, which means the domestication of the criticism, given that it must 
be comprehensible for those target-agents: “[According to the constructiveness condition] I 
must criticise them (and their actions, the institutions in which they participate, etc.) in a way 
that conforms to what ‘they’ define as what they can ‘reasonably’ be expected to do and 
results they can ‘reasonably’ be expected to accept”.18 This should probably be understood as 
an explicit attack on the Rawlsian language of the liberal principle of legitimacy19 – the point 
Geuss is trying to make is that the radical potential of criticism is lost if one “allow[s] the 
existing social formation to dictate the terms on which it can be criticized […]”.20  
The rejection of the constructiveness condition, however, does not mean that Geuss is 
not interested in how criticism relates to its specific context, how it becomes intelligible, as 
what is ‘constructive’ for us may not be so for others. To the contrary, he stresses  
“the extreme importance in criticism of notions like possibility and necessity, alternative identities  
and courses of action, which points in what framework are taken to be fixed and which are taken 
to be variable. This in turn raises important general issues about the malleability of human nature 
and institutions, and the possible limits of such malleability, utopianism, tragic or otherwise 
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irresolvable forms of conflict, and the ‘substitutivity’ of goods, services, practices, and 
institutions.”21  
After all, Geuss holds that “[p]art of what politics is about is that we wish to be and live 
as people of a certain kind”.22 
This shows that Geuss’ position is not simply a flat-out rejection of the idea that 
criticism can or even should be action-oriented and -orienting, but rather an attempt to 
operate criticism in political theory at a higher level of self-reflection. The (rejection of the) 
constructiveness condition requires substantial self-examination with regard to who we are 
and what can, for us, count as constructive and how this limits criticism. This seems to offer a 
fruitful way for engaging the tension between the goal of practically oriented and guiding 
political theory and political theory as potentially radically subversive criticism. 
The form which Geuss’ negative criticism actually takes is an eclectic mix of tools  for 
questioning, interrogating and problematizing the present use of concepts and their history as 
well as selected aspects of the political present. What Geuss calls – in reference to 
Foucault23– the ethos of enlightenment or of critique, “[a] set of attitudes, habits, and 
practices connected with continual criticism and self-criticism, and in general an openness to 
new experience”,24 underlies Geuss’ work on the “exercise of analytic abilities, of the 
imagination, especially the constructive imagination of alternatives to present ways of doing 
things, of discriminatory skill, and of judgment”.25 Geuss’ realism is propelled by this 
negative understanding of criticism which underlies its examination of the status quo, and 
which is instrumental to the goal of opening up ways for thinking and acting differently, e.g. 
practically subverting the (conceptual) order of the present, the suspension of judgments or 




The diagnosis of power relations and the entanglement between description and evaluation 
The combination of the emphasis on the examination of one’s political context and the 
view that the purpose of political theory is principally critical leads to a tension with the rigid 
distinction between descriptive and normative forms of political thinking common in post-
Rawlsian liberal-normative political theory. Geuss programmatically rejects this distinction.26 
Due to the temporal and perspectival conditions under which politics and the study of politics 
take place, “in an arena in which the standards for evaluating what is ‘success’, what is a 
good idea, what is a desirable outcome, are themselves always changing and always in 
principle up for renegotiation”,27 the idea of purely normative ideas – ideas whose normative 
authority is based on their claim to be maximally distant from the particularities of politics –  
is unhelpful, particularly in the face of day-to-day phenomena which need to be dealt with, 
understood and evaluated. 
In order to assess the specific horizon for these changes and renegotiations, which for 
Geuss are such a central aspect of political theorizing that he terms it “a kind of experimental 
science (of concepts) [eine Art (begriffliche) Experimentalwissenschaft]”, a deep grasp of the 
context in question is required.28 Rather than engaging in the mastery of principles and 
theories, Geuss holds, diagnosis is key for a critical and practically oriented understanding of 
political theorizing: 
“Instead of looking for general principles, one should rather engage in the diagnosis of one’s 
current context (Zeitdiagnostik treiben): What are the pressing problems, what the most acute 
dangers of the present? [...] Only in conjunction with an always quite complex diagnosis of the 
current situation, which interprets given facts in relation to possible, future developments which 
are partly dependent on our actions, and in relation to our factual structure of hope and fear ,  is ,  I  
hold, a somewhat defensible and politically relevant ethics thinkable.”29 
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This diagnosis combines phenomenological and genealogical elements in order to 
produce local, practical knowledge about and for a specific context.30 It is oriented toward 
(identifying) problems and aims to provide some orientation for how to address these 
problems. The diagnosis has to deal with such a mass of phenomena which are also in flux 
that it will always remain to some extent incomplete, indeterminate and contestable. The 
challenge of diagnosis is further complicated by the fact that contemporary societies are 
“hyper-complex structures”, i.e. structures which contain an account of themselves as 
structures, in which the diagnostician is herself embedded.31 For the purposes of diagnosis, 
not the dichotomy between an ideal world and a real one corrupted by power – a choice 
which contributors to the realist literature at least view as possible32 – provides orientation for 
making decisions, but rather these decisions always take place within a welter of half-baked 
views and incomplete knowledge: 
“The difference between truth and its opposites, and between more admirable and less admirable 
forms of politics, is not a difference between a disembodied realm of ideal discourse and the 
sordid world of interests, powers, and complex motives but a distinction within this latter world – 
the real one which we in any case always inhabit.”33 
These conditions underscore that the diagnostic process is an exercise of interpretation 
(for which ideal theory abstractions are not helpful), which is rather reflective and conceptual 
– depending on the experimentation with concepts in order to be able to identify problems – 
than a collection of empirical data.34 How the focus of the examination is selected and how 
the phenomena in it are classified and compared will depend to a considerable extent on the 
presuppositions which are brought into the diagnostic process. Diagnosis is thus not a purely 
descriptive task, but also entails normative aspects through the need to position oneself to the 
object of study which brings the entanglement between descriptive perspectives and 
evaluations into Geuss’ focus. Instead of looking for a set of normative principles to order a 
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political context, Geuss focuses on the forms of normative thought which are always already 
present within a particular context and which, with Michael Theunissen could be called the 
“inner normativity of historical reality” or of the present.35 This is why the application of 
diagnosis to political questions especially requires self-reflection on and explication of these 
presuppositions. This means, in short, that questions of normative orientation are already 
answered in a specific context and the task of ethical reflection through political theory is 
hence not the abstract quest of normative grounding or (even) justification, but engaging 
these answers:  
“Ethics is not a closed, nor at all finalizeable set of doctrines, as long as human life, as we know 
it, does not change its basic structure. Ethics is a perpetual practice, namely a continuous  ac tivity 
of reflection. As we de facto are always already moving in a field full of seeming authorities, it is 
not as important to ask abstractly how one could at all submit to something like an authority, as  to 
direct specific questions at concrete claims to authority and validity [gegenüber konkreten 
Geltungsansprüchen]. Asking questions, after all, is also one way to act and – as Socrates  felt on 
his own body – one which is not always free of danger.”36 
The examination of the present on which the ability to ask such questions depends will 
already be characterized by selections of foci and reactions to the normative claims of the 
present which make this superficially descriptive task entangled with normative aspects. The 
asking of particular questions, for Geuss, counts also a kind of political action and marks the 
practical orientation of critical and self-reflexive political theory as interrogating concrete 
problems. This may seem an extreme position denying the possibility of finding anything but 
very local criteria for evaluation and might seem to question the point of philosophical 
criticism. However, Geuss’ point is rather that the specific claims to authority in question 
cannot be reduced to being an instantiation of a (more) general set of principles, but that the  
criteria for their evaluation should be generated from the diagnosis of the specific context. 
This view does not preclude the possibility of criticism with transformative goals which, if 
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successful, will likely contain a context-transcending outlook e.g. through the innovation of 
new conceptual vocabulary to grasp a situation as problematic and political. It only means 
that evaluative criteria (and the context-transcending outlook) can only be developed from 
within the specific context.  
His emphasis on the entanglement between descriptive and normative aspects of 
political theory also leads Geuss to skepticism with regard to the possibility of the separation 
between the methodology of political theory, political theory, and politics . His understanding 
of realism regards political theory as partisan, as embroiled in power relations and potentially 
as political action. He particularly emphasizes the questions of how liberal-normative 
political theory is ideologically connected to the current political status quo. This underscores 
the need for a closer scrutiny of the relationship of political theory to its political context. 
This requires interrogating the framework of liberal-normative political theory, including its 
focus on normativity, normative principles and its philosophical toolkit.37 Recognizing the 
involvement or rather entanglement of political theory in relations of power further 
underscores for Geuss the need for self-reflection of realism in political philosophy:  
“A realistic attitude has to put the possibility on the agenda that one can become engaged in a 
certain society in one way or another. As taking a realistic attitude is in itself an action, for w hic h 
one needs to decide – nobody becomes a theorist, let alone a critic, of one’s society without his  or  
her own involvement – realism always needs to reflect upon itself and its possibility, otherwise it 
would be naïve.”38 
This is compatible with viewing the redemption of the lack of reflection on historical, 
sociological or psychological questions as a principal task of political theory.39 However, 
Geuss is well aware that purging all illusions is itself an illusion and that political theory is 
itself always potentially ideological in a pejorative sense.40  
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The most important concept and set of actions for a negatively critical and self-
reflexive diagnosis of the present are relations of power, often especially in their indirect 
impact on the reflection on these relations through ideological illusions, wishful thinking, and 
the taking for granted of day-to-day evaluations.41 Even if Geuss states in Philosophy and 
Real Politics that “to think politically is to think about agency, power, and interests, and the 
relations among these”,42 the focus on relations of power does not imply a view of power as a 
kind of totalizing iron cage or as a materialist antidote to culture.43 Geuss further rejects the 
view of power which is usually somewhat crudely attributed to classical IR realists as 
proponents of a kind of Realpolitik, i.e. power as the capacity to push through one’s interests 
by any means which makes power a crudely understood commodity.44 In contrast to the 
tendency to look at power from a normative point of view, which binds the normative hold of 
power to it being rightful and characterizes most of the history of Western political thought, 
power as right,45 Geuss does not view power as in itself normatively problematic.46 For him 
power is a useful concept for analyzing historical (genealogy) and sociological (criticism of 
ideology, to be appropriated for local, not global criticisms of ideology) limitations of the 
perspectives that people can have on themselves and their specific context, with a focus on 
questions of collective action.47 This should be read as an attempt to overcome the view of 
the concept of power as normatively negative, or even as ‘poisonous’, which prevents its 
discussion and evaluation beyond the division between legitimate and illegitimate power. 
Power is, however, not the only relevant factor, but nearly always a relevant factor, for the 
diagnosis of a political and social order. This view is encapsulated in Geuss’ thus far 
undeveloped idea of the “detoxification of power”.48 It makes most sense to develop this idea 
against the background of the shift of the understanding of power which can be found in 
Foucault’s later work on governmentality,49 in which techniques of power and the 
rationalities of governing are in focus, not the questions of legitimacy and the ‘rightfulness’ 
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of power.50 In a characteristic passage Foucault formulates the change of perspective on 
power as follows: 
“Not to ask oneself: is power good or bad, legitimate or illegitimate, a question of right or of 
morality, but to try, simply, to strip the question of power from all the moral and juridical 
framework, which has affected it up to now, and ask this naïve question which has not been asked 
that often, even if effectively a certain number of people have been asking it for a long time: w hat 
do relations of power, at their base, consist of?”51 
Thus understood, the detoxification of power then means to view power not as 
(necessarily) normatively negative, not as to be evaluated in moralized terms, but in terms of 
first asking what power means in a specific context and then analyzing its effects, both 
creative and limiting or destructive. Power is not per se good or bad but potentially 
dangerous. If the exercise of power with regard to collective action is characterized by what 
Foucault calls “conducting conduct” of oneself and others,52 and if such power relations are 
present in quotidian practices such as communication, then the question is not how to be free 
from power, but how to problematize, make visible and eventually minimize domination 
relationships.53 For this purpose, the strategies and techniques of power require close 
analysis, beyond the relationships between state and citizens (especially if understood as a 
conflict between authority and autonomy).54 
In Geuss’ writings this is expressed in the centrality of the question, “who does what to 
whom for whose benefit?”,55 which has to be read as a guideline for the negative-critical 
diagnosis of certain aspects of the political present, e.g. what power techniques propel the 
distinctions between wants and needs,56 or what are the power techniques and strategies 
which allow liberal political theory to be viewed as advancing egalitarian goals?57 The 
concentration on techniques and strategies of power in the way that they affect how people 
govern themselves and others, on such relations of power in quotidian realities , does not 
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mean a ‘flight from philosophy’. Rather philosophical tools are used to enable the perception, 
understanding and interpretation of these power relations. Thus understood, the detoxification 
of power has important implications for the understanding of political theory as a critical 
activity. Whilst the detoxified view of power does not come with an inbuilt condemnation of 
power, it still does not diagnose relations and techniques of power for the sake of description 
only. This raises the question of the criteria for evaluating relations of power. Providing an 
answer to the question of how an understanding of power close to the later Foucauldian view 
is compatible with the critical project, as which Geuss’ realism has been presented thus far, 
would be a way to counter this worry about the lack of normativity. Actually Foucault 
himself offers a way to reconcile these two elements: 
“Maybe philosophy can still play a role on the side of counter-power, on condition that, in facing 
power, this role no longer consists in laying down the law of philosophy, on condition that 
philosophy stops thinking of itself as prophecy, pedagogy, or legislation, and that it gives itself the 
task of analyzing, elucidating, making visible, and thereby intensifying the struggles that take 
place around power, the strategies of adversaries within relations of power, the tactics employed,  
and the sources of resistance, on condition, in short, that philosophy stops posing the ques tion of  
power in terms of good and evil, but poses it in terms of existence.”58 
Foucault’s view of how the critical potential of philosophy, despite the rejection of its 
ambition to ‘legislate’ through moral principles, could be retained lends support to the view 
that it is compatible with a detoxified understanding of power, however, only if the self-
conception of philosophy, in our case more specifically political theory, is amended to reflect 
its entanglement with the political and social order. As such a change of the self-conception 
of political theory is at the heart of Geuss’ realism, we can accept Foucault’s suggestion as 
one possible answer to the potential objection levied against the detoxification of power that 
it would be incompatible with understanding political theory as a critical project because of 
the lack of a normative foundation. Foucault’s emphasis on self-reflection and self-critique of 
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philosophy (and political theory), with regard to its relationship to different techniques of 
power as its main task, further underscores the compatibility of criticism with the idea of 
detoxifying power: “After all […] the task of philosophy today could well be [to ask the 
following questions]: What are the relations of power in which we find ourselves and in 
which philosophy has become, at least for 150 years, embroiled?”59  
Thus far Geuss has mostly questioned, interrogated and problematized contemporary 
conceptual schemata using conceptual analysis, genealogy and criticism of ideology. Whilst 
these schemata are an important element of the exercise of power and wider techniques and 
strategies of power (as a kind of governing in Foucault’s sense), the development of Geuss’ 
realism would greatly profit from being supplemented by broader criticisms of techniques 
and strategies of power, which Geuss has thus far only attempted tentatively in shorter 
pieces.60 
In sum, Geuss’ emphasis on the diagnostic task of political theory and his view about 
the normative character of such diagnosis – that normative claims are already inherent in a 
political context and need to be examined and that this requires political theory to relate to the 
normative claims inherent to this context in ways which are both descriptive and normative –  
particularly brings the entanglement between descriptive and evaluative aspects of political 
theorizing to the fore. For such an examination of the present Geuss places special emphasis 
on the importance of contextual diagnosis, which then cannot be separated from his 
understanding of the purposes of political theory, i.e. to be subversively critical of the status 
quo.61 This is the basis for the reconnection of the critical purchase of political theory to the 
diagnosis of its political context. The detoxification of power shifts from understanding 
power as a normatively negative influence on potentially autonomous agency to the analysis 
of the effects of techniques of power and relations of power on a political and social order. 
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Detoxified power is central to Geuss’ aspirations for political theory to help provide a 
contextual understanding of politics, which is the prerequisite of concretely practically 
guiding criticism. The detoxification of power leads to changes in the way criteria for 
evaluating political regimes are generated. 
 
The Understanding of Politics and of what is Political 
What counts as political cannot be generally defined – rather what is viewed as a 
political question depends on the historical context. Geuss regards politics in the wider sense 
as “a way of seeing or considering the world”, not “a special domain, like biology or 
astronomy”.62 “‘This is a political matter’ means it is a matter considered in some sense to be 
potentially in our power and up for decision, and which we have some potential interest in 
dealing with in one way rather than another”.63 Geuss’ narrower understanding of politics 
adds to the above “at least the threat of recourse to coercion, force, or violence”, which is 
“presented as being not merely a fact to be accepted but in some way ‘legitimate’.”64 This 
understanding certainly differs in emphasis from those realist understandings which focus on 
conflict and the conditions of legitimacy.65 However, one might also argue that Geuss’ 
understanding of politics is not especially unusual when he claims that “[p]olitics depends, to 
a great extent, on judging what is actual relative to what is possible”.66 To make this 
judgment on the basis of this phrase alone would, however, miss the mark. The understanding 
of the key terms ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ and of how philosophical inquiry can add to their 
understanding is a useful key to a more nuanced view of Geuss’ understanding of politics. 
Here it makes sense to start from the emphasis on the diagnosis of the present political 
context as a central element of Geuss’ political theorizing.  
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The actual for Geuss is not easily grasped. Political theorists are advised to approach 
their surroundings with suspicion, to be wary of what is alleged to be actual and to inquire 
into how this has come to be viewed as actual: 
“I would contend that what is ‘out there’ is usually a farrago of truths, half-truths, misperceptions, 
indifferent appearances, and illusion that needs to be seriously processed before one can accept 
any of it as ‘real’. […] One specifically modern form of social control is to allow free express ion 
of all opinions, thus creating a chaotic landscape of informational overload in which potentially 
important facts simply get lost in the welter of surrounding nonsense, and important connec tions  
cannot be made.”67 
Geuss does not, however, embrace an essentialism of the real, but rather uses this 
attitude of suspicion in order to motivate criticism through diagnosis, the suspension of 
judgment or distancing of oneself, e.g. from the conglomerate of ‘liberal democracy’.68 
Rather than trying to unmask the ‘real’, Geuss is interested in attempting as  thoroughly as 
possible to account for the history of the present, including the contingency (through 
genealogy) and the forms of distortion (through criticism of ideology) which could offer ‘us’ 
a different perspective on the questions within our collective agency.69 This could be taken as 
a commitment to the claim that only that which has a history is relevant for political 
theorizing which leads to the view that what is concretely political can only be determined in 
and for a specific context. This hangs together with the question of agency. Politics is about 
the reflection on the limits of agency in a collective mode in a specific situation and “to fail to 
appreciate the radical difference between individual action and institutionalized forms of 
collective action is to miss the point of politics”.70 Political theory needs to ask how the 
institutionalized forms of action in question have become the centre of the possible actions 
for structuring living together.71 For the diagnosis of the actual and the possible thus 
premised, Geuss views actions and contexts of action as much more salient than opinions, 
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especially if these are the opinions of individuals abstracted from their context.72 This is the 
sense in which one should understand Geuss’ claim that, “[p]olitics is a craft or skill, and 
ought precisely not to be analysed, as Plato’s Socrates assumes, as the mastery of a set of 
principles or theories”.73 
Similarly, the possible is not easily limited either. To what extent can one, from the 
point of view of the present, predict the limitations of the possible for the future? Geuss is 
concerned with the danger of a too narrow understanding of the possible and invites utopian 
thinking in political theory. However, how he understands ‘utopian’ needs to be qualified. 
The utopian is not the drafting of blueprints. Rather, similar to the rationale for negative 
criticism and contextual diagnosis, it is primarily a tool for reflection about one’s present 
situation. 
The originality of Geuss’ view of the utopian, especially with regard to the discussions 
of realism, lies in his attempt to break the hold of the view that a realistic political theory 
should be non- or even anti-utopian: “A realistic assessment of the situation means one which 
is not marred by wishful thinking, ideology or being stuck in taking for granted the quotidian 
evaluations (Befangenheit in den Wertselbstverständlichkeiten des Alltags). ‘Realism’ in this 
sense is not at all necessarily anti-utopian.”74 Rather, realism is not primarily opposed to 
utopian thought but to ideological thought and should be open to the cultivation of the 
utopian imagination:  
“There is a pole of realism and there is a pole of utopianism. There is a pole which tells you don’t 
be a victim of wishful thinking, don’t be a victim of ideological illusion, don’t be a victim of 
various kinds of repressive identities, and then there is a pole of cultivating what you want and 
taking your desires seriously and clarifying them, even if they are utopian in their content, even if  
they can’t be satisfied in the life that we lead. And it seems to me that both of these things  are an 
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important part of [realism]. […] Political philosophy has to be both fully realistic and fully 
utopian.”75 
This emphasis on the interplay between diagnosis and the utopian imagination needs to 
be related back to the view that politics is a kind of craft or art. Really significant political  
action (including political theory) does not conform to existing rules: 
“Really significant political action, however, is action that, for better or for worse, neither s imply 
conforms to existing rules, nor intervenes […] to find craftsmanlike solutions to specific 
problems, but that changes a situation in a way that cannot be seen to be a mere instantiation of  a 
preexisting set or [sic] rules. It creates new facts, violates, ignores, or even changes the rules. Such 
action may, like significant original art, be extremely rare, but the fact that such disruptive change 
of existing systems of action is always at least a possibility is one of the things that gives politics 
its special character.”76 
From this point of view a political theory needs to be able to accommodate the 
emotional, the non-rational and non-systematic elements of politics, and reflect on the kind of 
intervention into politics which it cannot help but make.77  
In summary, political theory should focus on the actual, but should view it through the 
orientation toward the possible in order to connect to the possibility of thinking and acting 
differently, i.e. to the criticism and the transformation of the actual. Geuss’ realism in its 
understanding of politics interrogates both the actual and the possible in order to enhance 
‘our’ understanding of our present situation and so allows for the consideration of the tension 
between the actual and the possible as an important focus of political theorizing. 
 
Geuss’ realism as a radicalization of realism 
The preceding interpretation of key features of Geuss’ realism sought to outline its 
distinctive position in political theory. Now the contrast to a selection of limitations of the 
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prevalent understandings of realism in political theory will bring its potential to radicalize 
realism to the fore. Realism in political theory has been received as a more or less incisive 
challenge to the post-Rawlsian liberal-normative mainstream. However, the tensions between 
the realist departures from this mainstream, and where realists remain committed to it, have 
not been investigated thus far. Whilst a general discussion of the limitations of the departur e 
of realist criticisms from liberal-normative political theory and their positive development of 
realist political theory would require a more detailed treatment than can be offered here, I will 
briefly discuss how the distinctive features of Geuss’ realism depart from the positions taken 
by (the most critical and developed) realist political theories.78  
More specifically, I will focus on the question of how realists have attempted to relate 
their normative-critical to their practical ambitions. Despite the concentration of much of the 
debates about realism on the criticism of the critical purchase of moralism and ideal theory, 
realists have thus far mostly neglected the question of how their political theories can 
generate critical purchase, without taking recourse to an understanding of normativity based 
on moral criteria.79 In view of this lacuna, Sleat has recently argued that realism is in need of 
“the development of a critical realist theory”,80 which, however, would need to be based on 
an understanding of critical distance which does not depend on a moral criteria. However, 
realists have neither delivered any appropriate critical perspective, nor have they engaged in 
rethinking the critical purchase of their political theories. The only device that could be viewed 
as developed for these purposes by realists, Bernard Williams’ Critical Theory Principle,81 may be 
viewed to reintroduce moral criteria through its adherence to notion of freedom linked to the concept 
of autonomy. Rather realism has been characterized as only covering the contextually-
embedded and practically oriented facet of political theory,82 thus neglecting its critical task. 
This has led to a division of labor between political theory which uses context-transcending 
moral standards for criticism, but it is also politically impotent and political theory which 
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focuses on ‘facts’ of politics in a specific context, guides action within this context, however, 
lacks the resources to criticize the status quo of this context. This is the shorthand for the 
dilemma which is the basis of an argument for the division of labor which can be found in the 
debates.83 This particular dichotomy limits the horizon of the debates about realism by 
inhibiting the discussion of a radically critical and contextualist realism. Whilst this affects 
realists primarily interested in non-ideal theory the most, Williamsian realism is also affected, 
e.g. Sleat’s realist theory of legitimacy, which is based on the congruence between the 
rationale of legitimation offered by a claimant to authority and the beliefs of its addressees. 
His theory is characterized by the tension between the danger of being unable to distinguish 
the fabrication of such a congruence on the basis of the extant power (alone, or at least 
predominantly) of the claimant to authority from a congruence which is based 
(predominantly) on other reasons, without taking recourse to an understanding of critical 
distance.84 The development of a critical perspective appropriate to realism is in part inhibited 
by its anti-utopian orientation. This orientation is one of the basic features of realism which 
are derived from its opposition to Rawlsian political theory, in as far as ‘utopian political 
theory’ denotes theories which are overly ambitious with their agenda for change.85 
Utopianism is seen as a problem both in terms of the action-guidance of a theory, e.g. through 
its lack of feasibility,86 and in terms of the potential spiral of violence following disappointed 
hopes triggered by the foundering of utopian projects.87 This focus on conflict is the 
background assumption behind the emphasis on the anti-utopian form of most realist 
theorizing. Instead of utopian fantasy the appropriate focus of political theory is deemed to 
rest on order and stability which may lead to political conservatism, namely a tendency to 
affirm the status quo, given how difficult it is to predict the effects of political change so that 
change could be known to be compatible with order and stability.88 
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Geuss’ realism avoids the abstract and reductive dichotomizations as which the 
differences between liberal-normative political theory and realist alternatives could be 
schematically portrayed between descriptive and normative, consensus- and conflict-
centered, or even optimist and pessimist approaches due to his emphasis on the need for close 
critical and diagnostic examination of the ‘actual’. In order to get to a perspective through 
which one can make informed judgments of one’s political context, Geuss invites the student 
of politics to approach her political context through a variety of perspectives which make use 
of philosophical tools such as conceptual analysis, criticism of ideology or genealogy  which 
are not used for thought exercises of comprehensive abstraction, but rather for the 
examination of the empirical realities as well as, based on this examination, thought exercises 
of making the familiar strange. For the latter the (potentially utopian) imagination is a key 
resource. These diagnoses and thought exercises are motivated by a negative impulse to start 
from problems or with the problematization of the status quo. 
Geuss’ realism is characterized by engaging the tension between the descriptive and 
normative aspects of political theorizing. From his point of view political theory should aim 
to be practically oriented and orienting, yet at the same time should try to achieve this 
through diagnosis of the respective political context led by potentially radical ly subversive 
criticism.89 Geuss thus offers an intensification and opening of our self-examination. The 
depth of his (self-) examination which starts with problematizing and questioning the present  
is illustrated by the questioning of the coherency of the ‘basic structure’ of their discourses 
which is the moral and political vocabulary centered on concepts like justice, rights, political 
authority, and legitimacy.90 For this endeavor he takes seriously the importance of discursive 
power, or rather, the power of interpretation, viewed as a kind of action. His rejection of the 
constructiveness condition of criticism enables subversive criticism, but also leaves open a 
tension between the practical orientation and radically subversive and critical outlook of his 
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realism. To substantiate the distinctiveness of his perspective, further work on his change of 
the bases of critical purchase of political theory is required. Whilst Geuss rejects 
philosophical claims to objectivity as a basis for political authority,91 he reserves space for 
philosophical tools to offer a somewhat superior perspective on and thus to affect the self-
conception of the agents involved and their assessment of their situation.92 The importance of 
this tension for Geuss’ realism points to the need for the development of a different 
understanding of critical distance, led both by the critical impetus of philosophy to examine 
oneself and one’s environment and by taking seriously the everyday actions which form the 
object of the political context as the basis for offering practical orientation.  
Overall the potential of Geuss’ realism to radicalize realism consists of his emphasis on 
the relationship between theory and its political context in terms of how they influence each 
other further focus and on the entanglement between the normative and the descriptive in 
political theorizing, as well as on the entanglement between the impulses of a political 
theorist for intervention and reflection, and between the analysis of seeming political 
necessities and the potentially utopian political imagination. How these entanglements and 
tensions are best addressed is still open to question, yet bringing them into view provides a 
potentially fruitful starting point for engaging them in a radicalized realism. 
 
Conclusion 
Raymond Geuss’ understanding of political theory as a self-reflective intervention into 
politics driven by the task of criticism bases its subversive and critical purchase on the 
combination of negative criticism and diagnosis. Such critical diagnosis depends on the 
interrogation, questioning, and problematization of concrete features of a political context. 
The emphasis on the need for a realistic political theory to focus on relations of power 
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requires a reconceptualization of the concept of power from being normatively sanctioned in 
either a positive or negative way to expressing contextually specific techniques and 
rationalities. This reconceptualization of power stands in close connection to the rejection of 
the normative qualification and broadening of the understanding of politics, whilst holding on 
to the critical-diagnostic task of political theorizing which, through its development of 
evaluative criteria for specific aspects of a political context, cannot help but be normative. 
The triangle of his emphasis on the entanglement between the descriptive and the normative, 
his commitment to bringing together the critical impulses to reflection and intervention, and 
the way he uses negative criticism for the interrogation of the status quo opens up the 
possibility of developing an understanding of the bases of critical purchase of political theory, 
the normativity of its criticism, which does not depend on the introduction of moral criteria 
external to the context in question. In reaction to the inner normativity of historical reality, 
Geuss’ takes the power of the imagination seriously, i.e. to give the importance of the utopian 
imaginary its due in the way political questions are construed and argued out, without thereby 
neglecting the close diagnosis of the actual, but rather bringing the contestability of the actual 
into view.  This entails a changed understanding of the relationship between political theory 
and its context which in turn enables him to overcome a self-imposed limitation common in 
the debates about realism to the choice between an either critical, but impotent or a 
contextualist but status quo affirming perspective. In sum, Geuss’ radicalization of realism in 
political theory offers a distinctive subversively-critical and reflexive political theory 
perspective. On the basis of the interpretation of Geuss’ realism offered here, realism in 
political theory could be taken into a new direction, with particular attention to be paid to the 
relationship between political theory and its context, in particular with regard to the 
normativity of criticism. My interpretation of Geuss’ realism, however, has not been 
exhaustive. Especially the connection to early Frankfurt School Critical Theory would be a 
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fruitful object of future research, particularly with regard to how Geuss’ realism could 
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